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ABSTRACT

In KSR Internationalv. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court may have sparked the
question: How should obviousness be decided as a procedural matter?
KSR
reaffirmed the holding in Graham v. John Deere Co.-that obviousness is a legal
determination decided against the background of particular facts. However, KSR
moved beyond Graham and stated on a number of occasions that "the court" is to
make various determinations. KSI s language logically suggests that the jury is to
answer interrogatories on specific factual questions and then the judge is to decide
the obviousness issue based on those answers. How the Federal Circuit and the
district courts interpret KSR to address obviousness as a procedural matter remains
to be seen.
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AN AFTERWORD

To: A

PANEL DISCUSSION ON OBVIOUSNESS IN PATENT

LITIGATION:

KSR INTERNATIONAL V. TELEFLEX

CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR.*

THOUGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF KSR ON THE PROCESS FOR MAKING
OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATIONS
One of the interesting questions presented by the Supreme Court's decision in

KSR is what impact it has, if any, on the process the district courts should follow to
decide obviousness challenges. The panel touched on this issue several times but did
not have the opportunity to explore it in any depth. It is a question that merits some
attention because KSR can be read to suggest that the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts may have very different ideas concerning how obviousness should be
decided as a procedural matter.
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 1 the Supreme Court held that the ultimate
question whether a patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of law.2 The
obviousness question of law, however, "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries,"-specifically, the scope and content of the prior art, differences between
the prior art and the patent claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the relevant
field. 3
These factual determinations form the background against which "the
obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined." 4 Further light
5
may be shed on the obviousness inquiry by "secondary considerations."
Although Graham sets out a framework of an ultimate question of law decided
against the background of particular facts, Graham says nothing about the process
through which obviousness determinations are to be made. Logically, the Graham
framework appears to contemplate an approach in which specific factual questions
are decided by a jury and the judge then determines the legal question of obviousness
with those facts in mind. As a practical matter, however, the district courts typically
do not proceed in this manner, and the Federal Circuit, although it has approved the
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1 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
2 Id. at 17.
3
Id.
4Id.
5Id. at 17-18. Secondary factors a court may consider, but is not limited to, include:
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others. Id.
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jury/judge split described above, 6 has not required it and indeed has permitted
7
district courts simply to submit the ultimate question of obviousness to the jury.
The decision in KSR International,Inc. v. Teleflex Inc.,8 provides a basis to
argue that permitting the jury to decide the ultimate question of obviousness is
wrong. First, KSR strongly reaffirms Graham, in particular Graham's holding that
"It]he ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination." 9 Second, unlike
Graham, KSR affirmatively states on a number of occasions that "the court" is to
make various determinations. The most extensive discussion follows:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple
patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the
marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To
facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
997, 998 (CA Fed. 2006) ("Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.").10
This passage seems to contemplate that the court will consider the scope and
content of the prior art ("teachings of multiple patents" and "demands known to the
design community..."), in light of the level of ordinary skill in the field
("background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill"), and then
decide whether the differences between the prior art and the claims (e.g., the
particular combination of "the known elements in the fashion claimed") would have
been obvious. 1 Further explaining the court's task, KSR goes on to state that "a
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior
art elements according to their established functions," 12 and that "a court can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ." 13 It seems quite clear from this that the Supreme Court sees
obviousness as a decision for the judge.
One possible response to the argument that KSR commits the obviousness
determination to the court is that, because KSR involved summary judgment, all of
the references to "the court" must be read with that procedural setting in mind. That
response seems incorrect. At several points in its opinion, the Court makes clear that
the obviousness analysis it is requiring is to be employed by patent examiners, as
well as by courts, 14 thus divorcing that analysis from the specific procedural context

6 See Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l., Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating
with regard to a finding of obviousness in the district court that "the jury makes written findings on
each factual issue, and the court applies the law to the jury's findings").
7 See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (overruling the
district court's holding that the patent was obvious as a matter of law because the jury's factual
findings on obviousness were substantially contradictory to such a holding).
8 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
9 Id. at 1745.
10 Id.at 1740-41 (emphasis added).
11

Id.

12 Id. at
13 Id. at

1740 (emphasis added).
1741 (emphasis added).
14 See, e.g., id. at 1734, 1742.
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of summary judgment in litigation.,15 Moreover, the KSR opinion devotes a separate
section to the question whether summary judgment was appropriate or was
precluded by disputed issues of fact. 16 This separate discussion of summary
judgment confirms that the discussion that precedes it addresses obviousness
determinations as a general proposition, not just on summary judgment.
So, a strong argument can be made that KSR requires that jury interrogatories
be submitted on specific factual questions and that the obviousness decision itself be
made by the judge. Of course, whether that is the correct approach as a tactical
matter is a separate question. The party who wins a general obviousness verdict is
in a stronger position on appeal because all factual issues are presumed to have been
resolved in favor of that party. 17 On the other hand, if a party proposes or acquiesces
in the general verdict approach and loses, it will be foreclosed from arguing on appeal
that jury interrogatories should have been used.
Procedurally, it would seem that the best way to tee up an obviousness case is
for the defendant (or the plaintiff) to move for summary judgment. If the court
grants the motion, of course, there will be no trial on obviousness. If the court denies
the motion, it must, in theory at least, have done so because there are disputed issues
of underlying fact. Since obviousness itself is a legal question, the denial of summary
judgment can only rest on some underlying factual dispute. The order denying
summary judgment should identify the disputed issue or issues, and those issues
presumably would be the subject of the trial and would form the basis for specific
jury interrogatories. One approach a litigant can take is to move for summary
judgment and see what happens--.e., if the motion is denied, what factual issues are
identified as being in dispute?-and decide then whether to propose jury questions or
a general verdict. The litigant could make its judgment based on its assessment of
its chances of persuading the jury as to specific disputed issues.
Of course, as with many things in the law, identifying the correct approach in
theory-Le., specific jury questions with the judge making the final decision-and
figuring out how to implement that approach in practice are two very different
things. It is easy to say that the jury should not be asked the ultimate question of
obviousness, but should address only the Graham factual inquires that form the
"background" against which the district court will make the ultimate legal ruling.
How a district judge actually constructs a manageable and understandable, and
useful, verdict form, and then uses the jury's responses to decide the legal issue of
obviousness, is another matter altogether. Or, perhaps there are other alternatives.
For example, can a district court fulfill its obligations under KSR by allowing the jury
to decide obviousness and then conducting the required detailed analysis in the
context of post-trial motions? The extent to which district courts, and the Federal
Circuit, interpret KSR to impose these obligations on the district courts, and the
techniques the courts develop to fulfill those obligations, remain to be seen.

15 Indeed, the case the Supreme Court cited for its requirement that the obviousness analysis

be made explicit, In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006), was an appeal from a PTO
determination.
16 See id. at 1745-46.
17 Jurgens v. McKasey, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

